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Most studies under the heading of ‘Europeanization’ are concerned with how 
European Union (EU) institutions, politics and policies affect member states’ polities, 
politics and policies. Europeanization is generally referred to as the process through 
which key political actors such as political parties, interest groups, national bureaucracies 
and legislators adapt themselves to the impact of European integration (Goetz 2000; 
Ladrech 1994/2005; Börzel 1999; Green Cowles et al. 2001; Hanf and Soetendorp 1998; 
Harmsen 1999; Kassim et al. 2000; Knill 2001; Olsen 2003). Many studies on the 
Europeanization of interest groups suggest that this impact is largely mediated through, 
and conditioned by, existing domestic institutions, policies, cultures and identities (see 
also Sidenius 1999; Cram 2001; Beyers 2002; Eising 2003; Grote and Lang 2003; 
Saurugger 2005). There is no automatic shift of activities and loyalties to the European 
level.  
For the purposes of this paper, we operationalize Europeanization with a focus on 
domestic interest groups. Europeanization concerns the extent to which an interest group 
acknowledges the impact of Europe on its substantive policy interests and/or the extent to 
which groups take this impact into account. Our operationalization basically concerns 
cognitive aspects of Europeanization, namely a disposition or a general political 
orientation which is coloured by the impact of Europe. It is quite similar to what Coen 
has labelled the ‘general behavioural preferences’ or the ‘locus of political activity’ and it 
fits into the more informal components of definitions offered by authors as Ladrech 
(Europe becomes part of the ‘organizational logic’) or Radaelli (‘styles’, ‘ways of doing 
things’, ‘beliefs’…, or ‘discourses’) (Ladrech 1994, 69; Coen 1997, 99-100; Radaelli 
2003, 30).  
One of the problems for theoretical and empirical research on Europeanization is 
that the key concept, Europeanization, is characterized by a product-process ambiguity 
(Hacking 1999, 36-8). It can be both, namely ‘the process of Europeanizing’ as well as 
the result, ‘being Europeanized’. Therefore, it is difficult to distinguish dependent from 
independent variables or domestic from European factors. As suggested by Saurugger 
(2005), one way to circumvent this problem is to adopt a comparative research design 
which includes a micro-level analysis at the level of the interest groups themselves. Instead of just comparing general patterns across countries or sectors, we look at how 
individual organizations have adopted attitudes which are oriented towards Europe. 
Thereby we focus on the conditions which coincide with high or low levels of adaptation 
at the level of individual interest groups.  
We conceive domestic interest groups as part of a European multilevel polity, 
which can be considered as the interest group’s fundamental or potential niche, i.e. the 
multidimensional space in which groups flourish and survive (Gray and Lowery 1996). 
Theoretically, ‘Europe’ belongs to the fundamental or potential niche of all domestic 
interest groups (Ladrech 2005). However, not many organizations utilize their 
fundamental niche in full. Our main empirical question concerns therefore the niche that 
is effectively used by domestic interest groups, i.e. their realized niche. In this respect, 
Europeanization might also be considered as the result of a process whereby the scope of 
the niche in which domestic interest groups are traditionally active – or niche width – 
expands beyond national borders. This paper is an attempt to explain variation in the 
extent to which different domestic groups have expanded the scope of their niche by 
Europeanizing themselves in response to European integration.  What we illustrate is that 
interest groups are tied to their environment in very different ways and that their 
structural embeddedness has significant and substantial explanatory power for 
Europeanization.  
 
Conceptualization and research questions 
Some interest group researchers explain the Europeanization of interest groups by 
developments at the European level. European integration is an obvious factor as the 
expanding scope and deepening role of the EU and its institutions provides a powerful 
incentive for interest groups to take EU policy-making into account in their strategies and 
activities (Hooghe and Marks 2001, 122 and 128-9; Constantelos 2004, 1028 and 1036). 
This argument emphasizes the importance of rent-seeking as a motivation which drives 
interest mobilization. As soon as policy-outputs are created by a government institution, 
interests will organize and try to reap the benefits of the policy. European institutions 
matter as well. Their attitude vis-à-vis interest groups is affected by their informational 
needs and by their concern to avoid a system overload (Michalowitz 2004, 81-2; Broscheid and Coen 2003). Finally, much of the literature on European interest groups 
stresses the importance of resources. Indeed, as EU policies are often quite demanding in 
terms of the expertise needed to gain influence, it is reasonable to expect that especially 
well-endowed groups are able to make use of the opportunities provided by the European 
multilevel system. Disparities in resources lead to disparities in the Europeanization of 
interest groups. This notion strongly emphasizes the capabilities of groups to organize 
and extends these capabilities into the institutional nature of the EU-system which is said 
to disadvantage or advantage some groups compared to others. 
Because Euro-level political opportunities may provide interest group with 
additional resources and abilities, several authors have suggested that the EU, or some of 
its institutions such as the European Parliament, provides opportunities for societal 
interests that are peripheral and weakly organized at the domestic level (Marks and 
McAdam 1996; Marks and McAdam 1999; Fairbrass and Jordon 2001). This enables 
groups to compensate their domestic weakness with Europeanization. In order to realize 
their objectives interest groups start to expand the scope of their activities and 
Europeanize their activities. Indeed, European institutions such as the European 
Commission and the European Parliament need information from the domestic level 
(technical advice, information about political support, potential compliance problems), 
but also domestic political players at the EU-level (ministers and bureaucrats in the 
Council of Ministers) are keen to stay in touch with domestic actors. Moreover, by being 
active on European issues domestic interest groups strengthen their domestic position as 
this enables them to provide crucial information to domestic public officials.  
In contrast, we argue that such a compensation-effect is not necessarily the only 
pattern. First of all, groups may be constrained by factors that are situated at the 
European level. Imig and Tarrow suggest that norms of appropriateness with regard to the 
action repertoire advantage especially ‘orderly, institutional and representative 
approaches’ and thereby excludes groups that rely on contentious politics (1999, 130). 
Constraints may also exist at the domestic level.  Several authors have tried to identify 
such constraints and their impact on the propensity of national interest groups to 
Europeanize. Eising and Kohler-Koch for instance, refer to the ‘Beharrungsthese’ 
(obstinacy thesis) where a negative correlation is found between the extent to which a group is integrated in domestic policy networks, and the extent of its integration in 
Europeanized networks (2004, 46; see also Sidenius 1999; Cram 2001; Eising 2003). In 
the same vein, Cram points to the relationship between domestic institutions and interest 
groups (preferential, selective, pluralist) on the likelihood that the latter will stick to their 
domestic polity (2001, 609-10). Schmidt points to the fact that national polities act as a 
potential learning school for the development of skills that are particularly important at 
the EU-level and explains differences by considering variance in this regard (1999, 164-
5; see also Coen 1998, 93; Eising 2004, 231). In an earlier paper, Beyers demonstrated 
that the Europeanization of network-strategies of domestic interest groups follows a 
cumulative pattern (2002, 601-3). In general, networking among domestic interest groups 
prevails and seeking access to national officials, especially the national government, is 
crucial. It is only after the establishment of domestic networks that interest groups start to 
extend their networks to the European level. 
In addition, many interest groups depend primarily on domestic institutions in 
order to realize their goals. Such groups have no need or incentive to Europeanize. 
Indeed, quite some policy areas – such as social welfare provision, cultural policy, and 
labor market regulation – are still excluded from the EU agenda. Therefore, in many 
cases Europe is not an alternative, but something that can be complementary to an 
ongoing process of interest mobilization (Ladrech 2005). This implies that, adaptation or 
Europeanization will depend on their immediate organizational environment. Moreover, 
Europeanized domestic interest groups may even strengthen their domestic position if 
they maintain their domestic networks.  
Our argument is thus that Europeanization is shaped by the immediate 
organizational environment of domestic groups. It ties into a more general theoretical 
account on critical resource dependencies. Most organizations are not internally self-
sufficient and maintaining sufficient resources is a daily concern for them (Bouwen 
2002). Organizations extract resources from their environment, resources that are 
supplied by other actors such as government subsidies, membership fees or gifts and 
donations. Gaining resources is costly and demanding. It requires an investment and 
interactions with actors providing such resources. It is important to note that gaining 
resources through exchange networks has rather ambiguous consequences for the actor’s autonomy. On the one hand, extracting resources from the environment can be seen as 
something that strengthens the actors’ position vis-à-vis others as more resources lead to 
more capabilities. On the other hand, resource dependencies can also be considered as 
something that reproduces or even strengthens existing dependencies. As Pfeffer and 
Salancik write: ‘(..) acquiring resources means the organization must interact with others 
who control those resources. In that sense, organizations depend on their environments’ 
(1978, 258) and, therefore, ‘what happens in an organization is not only a function of the 
organization, its structure, its leadership, its procedures, or its goals. What happens is also 
a consequence of the environment and the particular contingencies and constraints 
deriving from that environment’ (1978, 3). In this sense, gaining resources decreases 
autonomy and the propensity to expand the scope of attention towards policies and 
institutions which transcend the national level. This is especially the case when it 
concerns critical resource dependencies. As Pfeffer and Salancik indicate: ‘Criticality 
measures the ability of the organization to continue functioning in the absence of the 
resource (..)’ (1978, 46). The major weakness of a simple resource-based perspective that 
ignores critical resource dependencies is that it assumes that interest groups are always 
prepared to modify and Europeanize their strategies as soon as their material self-interests 
would require or their resources would enable them do so. Such a perspective neglects 
the possibility that actors refrain from going beyond the domestic level, because they are 
in need of, identify with or are loyal to their local or domestic resource suppliers.
i  
  Even tough it is often argued that especially resourceful organizations 
Europeanize, we argue that it is not necessarily size or resources that matter. More 
important is how organizations are structurally connected or tied to their environment. In 
particular, we emphasize how strongly an organization depends on its 
members/constituencies for its survival, the sector in which its main activities are located, 
and how dependent an organization is on sponsors in their immediate environment. For 
the moment, we identify three key factors - members/constituents, resource 
dependencies, and sector - , which will be analyzed in the empirical sections below.  
First, the relation between interest groups and members/constituencies is crucial. 
Does the interest group depend on its members and constituencies for its survival? The 
more an interest group relies on individual members to carry out management functions, and to help with campaigning, the more this group needs to be locally embedded in order 
to recruit these people. Then, a well-elaborated local network is needed in order to 
recruit, thereby creating the probability that organizations will be weakly oriented 
towards Europe. Also, if organizations have as their main task to deliver specific services 
or benefits to their members, they will be more locally embedded and relatively weakly 
Europeanized. Some benefits will constrain Europeanization as they may require an 
interest group to focus on one political system (for instance getting subsidies). Social 
security and welfare provisions supplied by domestic agencies are cases in mind. 
Advocacy with regard to policy areas where competencies are divided between the 
member states and the EU (see the third point) stimulates domestic groups to take a 
multi-level approach into consideration. 
Second, the exclusivity of monetary resources can be quite relevant for an 
organization too. Cram, for instance, refers to the issue of funds organizations gain from 
domestic sources (Cram 2001). She argues that national organizations that receive large 
amounts of money from their national government are not very autonomous; but that the 
other extreme, i.e. no funding at all, prevents organizations to carry out their tasks. In the 
latter case, the lack of funding explains the lack of Europeanization (as well as domestic 
political activity) while in the former case it explains the key attention organizations have 
for domestic institutions. So one of our questions concerns whether groups gain money 
from various sources and/or whether groups depend strongly on one kind of source. If 
one domestic funding source is predominant, does it concern government subsidies, 
individual membership fees or other sources of income? The dependence on domestic 
public institutions is a factor that affects the absence or presence of exit options and the 
potential Europeanization of an interest group. The more domestic interest groups depend 
on resources exclusively provided by government agencies such as subsidies, the more 
these groups restrict their actions to the domestic political system. 
Third, the importance of domestic constituents is to a large extent affected by the 
policy-sector in which an actor is active. Research carried out by Bennett among firms 
provides some clues. He has shown that businesses differ with respect to the political 
route they choose in response to the geographical location of their main interests (Bennett 
1999). Firms that are situated in a sector that is weakly internationalized, in which domestic protection (for instance through regulation or redistributive policies) plays a 
major role, where industry is concentrated in one country, or where there are clear 
national interests, were more likely to rely on national modes of interest representation 
instead of European ones. Such firms were also less likely to Europeanize their strategies. 
A similar argument applies to how policy competencies are divided within the EU. Some 
interest groups are active in policy domains where EU competencies are weak or non-
existent and where most policy benefits are realized by national governments. Such 
groups will not need to Europeanize, while groups that are active in strongly 
Europeanized sectors will ceterus paribus adapt more.  
 
Research design 
The dataset we use is part of a larger research project on how interest groups 
interact with public actors in four EU member states – Belgium, France, Germany and the 
Netherlands – as well at the EU-level. The focus of the project is thereby on the efforts 
these groups make to influence the EU’s external trade policies in the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), more particularly in the areas of agriculture, steel/metal and 
services. One part of this larger project tries to find out whether and how national interest 
groups have Europeanized their political strategies. Data collection has been based on an 
elite-survey conducted between May 2003 and February 2006.  
One of the problems with elite-surveying concerns the identification of a relevant 
sample of interest groups. As part of the research questions can only be dealt with in a 
comparative design, cross-sectional samples that are structurally equivalent and 
comparable across countries are needed. For each country and the EU-level we aimed at a 
final sample of 120 completed interviews; 20 with public officials and 100 with interest 
groups.
ii In addition to this we tried to get a diverse sample with a large variety of interest 
groups including NGOs, public interests, business interests and labor interests. Basically, 
our sample is constructed on the basis of a positional sampling technique for which we 
screened a large amount of formal sources.
iii  
The established list, however, does not correspond with a balanced cross-sectional 
sample that is structurally equivalent across countries. Regarding sectoral business and 
labor interests we only retained those sectoral associations that have a direct (agriculture/food industry, metal/steel, services) or an indirect link (transport and 
retailing/distribution) with the policy sectors under investigation. NGOs were retained in 
the sample as well as cross-sectoral specific interest groups such as cross-sectoral 
employer unions, trade unions and associations representing small and medium 
enterprises (SME’s). Several steps were taken to avoid a biased sample with regard to 
access and mobilization; less visible and less active organizations run the risk to be 
excluded. This risk was particularly high for trade unions. Although trade unions play an 
active part in domestic politics (especially in neo-corporatist countries such as Belgium, 
Germany, or the Netherlands), they were barely named in the sources mentioned above 
(Beyers and Kerremans 2007). In order to redress this potential bias, we proceeded as 
follows: First, for all international and European umbrella organizations mentioned in one 
of the above sources, we checked whether or not their European or domestic members 
were already included. If not, they were added. Second, for the three policy sectors, we 
investigated the potential cleavages so that our sample would include varying and/or 
opposing policy positions. In order to identify the actors connected to these cleavages we 
used the relational data-set compiled by Bernhard Wessels (Wissenschaftzentrum Berlin) 
which links Euro-level associations to their domestic members (Wessels 2004). Finally, 
we consulted a number of experts (especially with respect to trade unions) and checked 
the composition of key advisory bodies at the domestic and the EU-level (such as the 
EU’s Economic and Social Committee) in order to fine-tune the sample with regard to 
trade unions.  
Table 1 gives an overview of the results of the fieldwork regarding the interviews 
with interest group officials in the four countries.
iv We make a rough distinction between 
a) NGOs or public interest groups, b) economic/business and employers and c) trade 
unions. The first group consists of environmental NGOs, consumer NGOs, development 
NGOs and a small number of women’s organizations or organizations representing 
protest movements. The second group contains cross-sectoral business associations, 
sectoral business associations (primarily in the field of agriculture, services and 
metal/steel) as well as small ‘businesses’ such as farmers, professions and small and 
medium enterprises. Under the category of trade unions we find both cross-sectoral and 
sectoral employers’ associations. Although this categorization conceals much heterogeneity, it will be demonstrated below that much variation in the sample 
corresponds to this rough distinction.  
             
            INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
 
Interviews were conducted on the basis of a standardized questionnaire with 
almost all questions being closed. Key parts of the questionnaire dealt with different 
characteristics of the political system within which the actors operate, the policy positions 
of actors with respect to twenty policy issues, their political strategies (including both 
traditional forms of lobbying as well as outside lobbying) in relation to these issues, the 
resources actors had at their disposal and invested in political activities, and their 
embeddedness in domestic and/or European policy networks. In this article only a small 
subset of the variables will be used, namely those variables related to resource 
dependencies and Europeanization. 
 
Findings 
We focus the analysis on the relationship between the level of Europeanization on 
the one hand, and the following variables on the other hand: (a) the type of interest group; 
(b) the nature and the extent of the group’s resource dependencies; and (c) the policy 
domains in which these groups have an interest. In the first part of the analysis we 
describe how different interest groups show a different level of Europeanization. Then we 
investigate the critical resource dependencies of different sorts of interest groups. Finally, 
we correlate resource dependencies and policy sector interest with the extent to which 
groups are Europeanized.  
As indicated above, we operationalize Europeanization as the extent to which an 
interest group acknowledges the impact of Europe and/or the extent to which a group 
takes this impact into account. We asked each organization official to what extent their 
focus of attention is directed towards EU policies, the impact of EU-level decisions on 
the organization, and the extent to which the organization monitors EU policies. It 
appears that EU policies are generally seen as having an important impact on most 
organizations (between 69 and 88 percent, table 2). However, there are significant differences between the four countries. Compared to their Belgian and Dutch 
counterparts, more German and French groups claim to experience a marked impact and 
more German and French groups monitor European policies. We also asked our 
respondent to indicate the percentage of their overall time and energy, expressed on a 
scale from 0 to 100, they spend on European policies. These data indicate that on 
average, German and French interest groups pay more attention to Europe than Belgian 
and Dutch groups (figure 1).  
The last three columns in table 2 shows the same data, but now cross-tabulated 
with the interest group type. Here, it appears that especially employers interests show a 
high level of Europeanization compared to public interests and trade unions. The 
differences between trade unions/NGOs and employers interests are often up to 30 
percent. This observation is confirmed when we compare time and resources spent on 
European policies across countries and interest group types. Employers or business 
interests are the most Europeanized everywhere. Only in Germany do we observe quite 
Europeanized trade unions, compared to Belgium, France and the Netherlands. As will be 
demonstrated below, some of these differences correspond to varying resource 
dependencies.  
 
INSERT TABLE 2 AND FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
A factor analysis of these four variables results in a single-factor solution with an 
eigenvalue of 1.58 (39 percent of the total variance). The lower the factor scores, the 
more Europeanized groups are. Note that the distributions within the four member states 
on these factor scores fit into the pattern described above. Note also the differences 
across the four countries (figure 2). Groups in the two larger member states tend to be 
more Europeanized than their counterparts from the smaller member states. Further, the 
differences within Belgium and the Netherlands are considerably higher than the 
differences within France and Germany, something that is indicated by the standard 
deviations for Belgium (.87), the Netherlands (.88), Germany (.73), and France (.69).  
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE  
In sum, the differences between the group types and the four countries are quite 
considerable. Our next step consists of analyzing the critical resource dependencies of the 
interest groups across the four countries. Table 3 shows the result for five potential 
income sources: (1) individual membership contributions and individual donations, (2) 
membership fees from companies, (3) government subsidies, (4) income from economic 
activities (such as the payments for services, revenue generated by the sale of goods, and 
the returns of investments and savings…), and (5) income from institutions and 
organizational entrepreneurs (such as donations by firms, organizations, or charities). 
Table 4 should be read as follows: 82 percent of Belgian NGOs get their funding from 
government subsidies and among these 82 percent, government subsidies represent an 
average share of 57 percent of their budget. 
In table 3 it becomes immediately clear that organizations differ a lot in terms of 
their critical resource dependencies. Let us start with the trade unions: in each of the four 
member states, they prove to be extremely dependent on individual contributions. 
Between 60 and 96 percent of the trade unions rely on the payment by their individual 
members of membership fees. On average, these fees account for 64 and 96 percent of 
their overall budget. NGOs, in contrast, have a more diversified structure of income. A 
large majority of them depends on government subsidies. This dependency is much 
higher in Belgium and the Netherlands than in Germany and France. In the small 
countries, 76 and 82 percent of the NGOs depend on such subsidies, which represent an 
average of 57 to 59 percent of their overall budget. In Germany and France, 68 percent of 
NGO’s rely on this source, which accounts for between 42 and 45 percent of their overall 
budget. Given these results, one could plausibly claim that the Belgian and Dutch NGO’s 
are more critically dependent on government subsidies than NGOs in France and 
Germany. The picture is reversed for individual membership contributions. The lower 
reliance of French and German NGO’s on government subsidies is compensated by a 
higher dependency on individual membership contributions (up to 48 percent of their 
overall budget).  
 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE  
Finally, business interests and employers associations show an even higher level 
of diversity in their sources of income. What is striking here is the low dependency on 
membership fees paid by companies. Although more than 50 percent of the organizations 
receive an income from such fees, this source represents less that 10 percent of their 
budget on average. Quite a substantial share of the business associations depend on fees 
paid by individual members but this dependency is less substantial than the trade union’s 
dependency on such fees. Yet, a substantial difference exists between the small and the 
large member states. In the small member states individual membership fees tend to be 
much more important for the average business association than in the larger ones.  
Now that we have compared the critical resource dependencies of different 
interest groups, it is important to look how these groups perceive these dependencies. 
Perceptions on such dependencies may matter a lot in the choices organizations make on 
their activities and in the extent to which concerns about organizational maintenance 
guide these choices. For that purpose a question was asked about how organizations 
experience the competition for budgetary resoures. Does the organization experience 
much competition from others and if so, how strong is this competition perceived to be? 
Table 4 compares the perceived level of budget competition for the three types of interest 
groups and for each of the four countries. One of the first things that strike the eye is that 
those organizations that have the most diverse stream of income and that are the least 
dependent on their critical constituency, such as employers’ organizations, perceive on 
average the lowest level of budget competition. On average, NGOs and, especially, trade 
unions are much more likely to experience ‘moderate’ or ‘strong’ competition for 
budgetary resources.  
 
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
 
However, there are considerable differences among trade unions. The German 
trade unions are somewhat atypical as they demonstrate a much lower level of perceived 
budget competition, compared to the French, Dutch and Belgian trade unions. This might 
be due to the fact that the German trade union system is much more centralized and that one German trade union – the Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund – occupies a representation 
monopoly within the German neo-corporatist constellation. Therefore, it does not 
experience a high level of competition, at least not as far as individual member 
contributions are concerned.  Belgium and the Netherlands have a more fragmented trade 
union system with three trade unions each representing a substantial part of labor. In 
Belgium and the Netherlands, no single organization has been able to dominate the niche 
of labor representation. France, in contrast, combines a highly fragmented system of 
ideological radicalism with a low level of unionization. Given the high number of trade 
union organizations in France and given the fact that each trade union seeks to maintain 
its own ideological niche, it seems reasonable to assume that the French unions develop 
their own specialized ideological niche. This might explain why the average French trade 
union perceives less competition compared to Belgian and Dutch trade unions.  
What is the relationship between, on the one hand, perceived competition and 
resource dependencies and, on the other hand, the levels of Europeanization? As 
indicated above, given the fact that monitoring European policies is quite demanding it is 
plausible to expect a relationship between Europeanization and resources and resource 
dependencies. Yet, a comparison of table 3 and 4 with the data on Europeanization in 
figure 1 and 2 suggests that a low level of perceived budget competition corresponds with 
a lower dependency on a critical resource provider as well as with a more Europeanized 
orientation among interest groups. This seems to happen with regard to business interests, 
but also to some extent with regard to the French and the German trade unions. 
Conversely the Dutch/Belgian NGOs and trade unions combine a high level of perceived 
budget competition with a strong dependency on one critical resource (government 
subsidies or individual membership fees). Typically, their level of Europeanization is 
low.  
We measured the amount of resources in two ways. One consists of the size of the 
available budget, but the problem with this measure is that many respondents refused to 
answer to this question. The other measure consists of the number of full-time 
equivalents (FTE) employed. Here we have complete data and the high correlation with 
budget size (r=.89, p=.0001) suggests that staff can be considered as a valid indicator of a 
group’s resources. Table 5, first row, provides the correlations of this variable with the level of Europeanization. No significant correlations can be found, except in the case of 
Germany where we observe a small slightly significant correlation between a large staff 
resource and a higher level of Europeanization. In contrast, we find substantial 
correlations between the perceived level of budget competition and Europeanization for 
Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany. In the case of France, there is, probably due to a 
low standard deviation, no substantial association. These results indicate that high levels 
of perceived budget competition correlate with low levels of Europeanization. Interest 
groups that perceive severe competition feel themselves more vulnerable in terms of their 
organizational maintenance; these groups tend to be less Europeanized. It is useful then to 
take a closer look at these critical dependencies and their relationship with 
Europeanization. The remainder of table 5 provides the necessary information. 
As is indicated by this table, we observe statistically significant correlations of 
individual membership contributions, company membership contributions, and 
government subsidies with Europeanization. However, the results for individual 
membership contributions are unclear. German organizations that depend on individual 
membership fees are less Europeanized than those that do not, but this pattern is repeated 
in no other country. In the case of France, a growing importance of individual 
membership contributions in the overall income of interest associations corresponds with 
declining levels of Europeanization. In Belgium, the opposite takes place. There, a rising 
importance of individual contributions as a source of income corresponds with higher 
levels of Europeanization. 
The results with respect to company membership contributions and government 
subsidies are more straightforward. These confirm some of our earlier observations. 
Organizations that depend on company membership contributions are more 
Europeanized, a finding which reflects the fact that their constituents – business – are 
strongly Europeanized too. Important here is that dependency in terms of the proportion 
of company membership contributions to the organizations’ overall budget has no effect 
on Europeanization. Consequently, the critical nature of this resource in comparison with 
others cannot be considered to be a factor in the Europeanization behavior of these 
organizations. Whether or not this resource is critical, business associations are highly 
Europeanized.   
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE 
 
Again with the exception of France, organizations that depend on government 
subsidies are less Europeanized. Moreover, in Belgium and the Netherlands, the countries 
where many organizations (especially NGOs) are highly dependent on government 
subsidies, we find that the larger the share of government subsidies in the organization’s 
budget, the less the interest group is Europeanized. This suggests that rather than the type 
of organization, the provider of its critical budgetary resource matters. And in the case of 
Belgian and Dutch NGO’s, national governments are the providers. Clearly, they do not 
provide such subsidies for altruistic reasons. As neo-pluralists would claim, they do so 
because they believe that imbalances in the national interest group system need to be 
corrected. And when they assess such imbalances, they use a national perspective. 
Interest associations that depend on government subsidies know this. As a consequence, 
they will prioritize their immediate national environment in the first place. Less time and 
energy will be left to focus on Europe. At a more general level, these findings confirm 
that organizational maintenance and critical resource dependencies are crucial factors for 
understanding the Europeanization of national interest organizations.  
Our final research question concerns the policy domains in which an interest 
group claims to have the most interest. In order to be successful interest groups need to 
realize benefits for their members and constituents. For some interest groups these 
benefits need to be realized at the European level, while for others benefits must be 
realized at the domestic level. Presumably, groups with a large stake in the social security 
sector or labor market regulation and organizations whose influence activities affect the 
welfare benefits of their clients – for example trade unions – focus more on the policy 
level where key decisions with regard to social security and labor market regulation are 
taken. In contrast, national business organizations increasingly represent transnational 
and European companies that are active within the borders of a member state. These 
groups depend for the well-being of their constituents on how the European internal 
market operates. Being active in and being dependent on the international economy 
fosters Europeanization. In addition to the interest in a specific policy domain we hypothesize that Europeanization relates to the organization’s expansiveness. One could 
argue that Europeanization occurs especially among those organizations that are able to 
expand the scope of their policy interest, i.e. interest groups that are multiple niche 
players and have a broad niche width.  
During the interviews the respondents were asked to screen a list with policy 
areas in which they could be active. For each area the respondent was asked to indicate 
how important this particular policy area is for the organization. ‘Importance’ was 
defined as ‘having invested many resources in this particular policy domain (for example 
in terms of research, hiring staff…)’ and respondents scaled importance on a 5-point 
score, a low score implying high levels of interest. Consequently, a positive correlation 
between importance attributed to a policy area and ‘Europeanization’ means that being 
active in a specific policy area contributes to the Europeanization of an interest group. In 
addition, we create a variable, scope of policy, which simply measures the number of 
policy areas in which an interest group claims to be active. Accordingly, a negative 
correlation indicates that a large niche width corresponds to Europeanization.  
 
INSERT TABLE 6 HERE 
 
Table 6 shows the results and indicates that the division of competencies between 
the EU and the member states affects the Europeanization of national interest groups. The 
substantial correlations for competition policies, export policies and environmental 
policies illustrate that these are, at least among interest groups, highly Europeanized 
policy areas. Similar observations, although less pronounced in terms of correlational 
strength (especially for France), can be made for consumer policy, industrial policies, and 
research and development. So groups that are active in policy sectors with some 
substantial and significant EU competencies show higher levels of Europeanization.  
For policy areas that are highly dependent on governmental regulations, subsidies 
and allowances such as social security, employment policy, media and cultural policy, we 
observe no significant relation between importance and Europeanization. Table 7 also 
shows, however, that there are significant differences among the four member states. The 
same holds for the correlation between scope of attention and the level of Europeanization. The results indicate that a broader scope of attention tends to result in 
higher levels of Europeanization, with the relation being substantially higher in the case 
of the Netherlands, and substantially lower in the case of France. The moderate and 
sometimes low value of the correlation coefficients – even in some sectors where the EU 
has substantial competencies such as agriculture and fisheries – equally suggests that 
even in cases where interest groups consider these policy sectors to be important, 
Europeanization does not automatically follow.  
These results confirm our third proposition, namely that Europeanization is 
considerably constrained by a dependence on domestic policies. When we look to the 
type of groups interests in the least Europeanized policy areas we find predominantly 
labor unions; between 77 and 98 percent of the interviewed trade union officials claimed 
to be interested in social security, labor market regulation, and fiscal policies. In contrast, 
the interest for these policy areas is much lower among NGOs, but also among employers 
interest (here between 25 and 40 percent of the interviewed groups claimed to be 
‘interested’ or ‘strongly interested’).  
 
Conclusions 
The good news that comes out of this article is that Europeanization is not 
necessarily a privilege for large and resourceful organizations that are able to 
Europeanize. In this regard, we have to be careful with far-fetched conclusions in terms 
of resources driving the process toward Europeanization. Although, our empirical results 
do not reject the notion that EU-level opportunities stimulate Europeanization, our 
findings illustrate that Europeanization is much more complex and contextualized than 
the mere existence of European stimuli.  
Although a dependency on individual members and constituents has no direct 
relation with our dependent variable, we showed that especially trade unions that depend 
strongly on individuals and that operate in a context with higher levels of perceived 
budget competition – namely in Belgium, the Netherlands and France – were less 
Europeanized than German trade unions which are more monopolistic. The perception of 
budget competition and critical resource dependencies are more salient than resources as 
such. With regard to critical resource dependencies, we observed that especially a dependency on government subsidies constrains Europeanization. This correlation is 
most pronounced in Belgium and the Netherlands, two countries where the organizations 
that depend considerably on subsides, namely NGOs, experience severe competition for 
budgetary resources. Finally, we observe that policy domain matters. Some interest 
groups are strongly tied to policy sectors where EU competencies are weak or non-
existent and where most benefits are realized by national governments These groups are 
less pressured to Europeanize, not because they do not have resources or because they do 
not appreciate potential European benefits, but simply because they are still able to 
realize many of their political goals at the domestic level.  
In contrast to some of the existing literature we stress the fact that it is not 
necessarily ‘Europe’, i.e. the European institutions, or the resource endowment of interest 
groups that shapes their Europeanization. Without denying the potential importance of 
the role played by resources and EU-level opportunity structures, we demonstrated that 
an interest group’s embeddedness in its immediate environment as well as critical 
resource dependencies play a crucial role. Although the EU creates many new 
opportunities for domestic groups to adapt, Europeanization is not a natural or immediate 
response. Thus, instead of a logic of influence (for instance, exercising influence, 
designing political strategies and exploiting political opportunities), our analysis 
emphasizes that the Europeanization of interest groups is substantially shaped by factors 
related to the group’s immediate environment which affects its organizational 
maintenance. Such factors may relate to members (for instance, a dependence on 
membership dues), or to sponsors (for instance, a dependence on government subsidies) 
(see also Schmitter and Streeck, 1999; Michalowitz, 2004). 
We started from the general notion that the Europeanization of domestic interest 
groups can be explained by investigating the link between the interest characteristics and 
the immediate organizational environment of these groups. The empirical results show 
that in addition to the potential impact of the EU institutions themselves, more research 
attention has to be paid to the immediate context of a group and more in particular their 
critical resource dependencies. True, our empirical results remain somewhat illustrative 
and explorative. Detailed theory-driven case-studies are needed in order to enrich and 
refine some of the more general conclusions we arrive at. Second, we have neglected concrete political behavior, political strategies and tactics. In order to rebalance the 
underestimation of organizational maintenance without ignoring the relevance of the 
external political environment, more detailed research on the relation between specific 
political strategies and critical resource dependencies might be fruitful. Table 1. Overview of the sample and fieldwork results (Belgium, Netherlands, 
Germany and France) 
 Belgium  Netherlands  Germany  France  Total 
NGOs/public interests 
- sample 
- n response (%) 
 
53 
44 (83%) 
 
37 
34 (92%) 
 
36 
28 (78%) 
 
38 
34 (89%) 
 
164 
140 (85%) 
Economic/business/employers 
- sample 
- n response (%) 
 
87 
80 (92%) 
 
65 
57 (88%) 
 
73 
52 (71%) 
 
78 
62 (79%) 
 
303 
251 (83%) 
Trade unions 
- sample 
- n response (%) 
 
29 
24 (83%) 
 
18 
16 (89%) 
 
13 
10 (77%) 
 
36 
32 (89%) 
 
96 
82 (85%) 
Total 
- sample 
- n response (%) 
 
169 
148 
(88%) 
 
120 
107 
(89%) 
 
122 
90  
(74%) 
 
152 
128  
(84%) 
 
563 
473  
(84%) 
 
 Table 2. Europeanization of interest groups, countries and type of interest group (percentages) 
  Country  Type of interest group 
  Belgium  The 
Netherlands 
Germany  France  NGOs  Employers  Labor 
unions 
  N=150  N=107  N=90  N=126  N=140  N=250  N=81 
Policies originating at the European level are               
1.  the most important focus of attention  14%  9%  12%  21%  9%  21%  5% 
2.  an important focus of attention  74%  72%  78%  73%  69%  72%  88% 
3.  less important/not important  12%  19%  10%  6%  21%  7%  7% 
Extent to which decisions taken at the EU-
level affect the organization’s work 
 
     
 
   
1.  to a market extent  53%  49%  74%  71%  42%  74%  53% 
2.  to some extent  28%  44%  23%  25%  47%  22%  44% 
3.  negligible/no effect on organization  9%  6%  1%  4%  11%  4%  2% 
Extent to which the organizations monitors 
the implications of European policy 
 
     
 
   
1.    strong  51%  56%  70%  73%  43%  74%  58% 
2.    to some extent  37%  30%  27%  25%  41%  21%  37% 
3.    small/not at all  12%  14%  3%  2%  16%  5%  5% 
 
  
Figure 1. Percentage of time and energy spend on Europe
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Figure 2. Level of group Europeanization compared between 
countries (average factor scores)
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  23Table 3. Critical resource dependencies (percentage of organizations depending on a 
particular resource and the share of the budget) 
  Belgium  The Netherlands Germany  France 
NGOS         
individual membership  79% 
.33 
50% 
.36 
75% 
.48 
79% 
0.44 
company membership  - 
- 
12% 
< 0.10 
4% 
< 0.10 
12% 
< 0.10 
government subsidies  82% 
.57 
76% 
.59 
68% 
.42 
68% 
.45 
economic activities  52% 
.20 
50% 
.18 
43% 
.12 
35% 
.16 
institutions/entrepreneurs  50% 
.13 
68% 
.17 
64% 
.22 
62% 
.20 
Business interests         
individual membership  35% 
.66 
37% 
.60 
17% 
.24 
17% 
.34 
company membership  51% 
< 0.10 
61% 
< 0.10 
69% 
< 0.10 
59% 
< 0.10 
government subsidies  27% 
.29 
21% 
.30 
12% 
.45 
33% 
.38 
economic activities  52% 
.26 
59% 
.22 
48% 
.14 
31% 
.25 
institutions/entrepreneurs  31% 
.52 
33% 
.32 
50% 
.45 
48% 
.43 
Trade unions         
individual membership  96% 
.84 
94% 
.64 
60% 
.96 
78% 
.75 
company membership  4% 
< 0.10 
31% 
< 0.10 
- 
- 
3% 
n=1 
government subsidies  46% 
< 0.10 
37% 
< 0.10 
20% 
< 0.10 
53% 
.23 
economic activities  50% 
< 0.10 
81% 
.13 
50% 
< 0.10 
37% 
.17 
institutions/entrepreneurs  12% 
.49 
37% 
.37 
30% 
.91 
37% 
.26 
 
 
  24Table 4. Perceived budget competition 
  Belgium  The 
Netherlands 
Germany  France 
NGOS         
(1) ‘no competition’ and (2) ‘little competition’  27%  18%  16%  33% 
(3) ‘moderate competition’  46%  36%  32%  36% 
(4) ‘strong competition’  27%  45%  52%  30% 
Business interests         
(1) ‘no competition’ and (2) ‘little competition’  60%  58%  58%  64% 
(3) ‘moderate competition’  31%  38%  30%  18% 
(4) ‘strong competition’  9%  4%  12%  18% 
Trade unions         
(1) ‘no competition’ and (2) ‘little competition’  17%  12%  89%  34% 
(3) ‘moderate competition’  43%  38%  11%  21% 
(4) ‘strong competition’  39%  50%  0%  45% 
Index: Question was formulated as follows: Do you, in finding the resources you need, face 1) no competition from 
other actors, 2) little competition from other actors, 3) Moderate competition from other actors or 4) Strong 
competition from other actors.  
 
Table 5. Correlations of staff resources, critical resource dependencies and perceived 
budget competition with Europeanization (Pearson product moment correlations) 
  Belgium  The Netherlands Germany  France 
Number of FTE working for the 
organization 
-  -  -.22 (p=.0475)  - 
Perceived budget competition 
(4-point scale) 
.22 (p=.0110)  .34 (p=.0004)  .37 (p=.0006)  - 
Individual membership 
y/n 
average budget share 
 
- 
-.28 (p=.0086) 
 
- 
- 
 
.38 (p=.0002) 
- 
 
- 
.25 (p=.0488) 
Company membership 
y/n 
       average budget share 
 
-.20 (p=.0130) 
- 
 
-.34 (p=.0004) 
- 
 
-.40 (p=.0001) 
- 
 
- 
- 
Government subsidies 
y/n 
       average budget share 
 
.37 (p<.0001) 
.38 (p=.0014) 
 
.22 (p=.0199) 
.32 (p=.0403) 
 
.40 (p=.0001) 
- 
 
- 
- 
Economic activities 
y/n 
       average budget share 
 
- 
- 
 
- 
- 
 
- 
- 
 
- 
- 
Institutions/entrepreneurs 
y/n 
       average budget share 
 
- 
- 
 
- 
- 
 
- 
- 
 
- 
- 
Index: The Pearson product moment correlation between ‘average budget share’ and ‘Europeanization’ is only 
calculated for those organizations depending on a particular resource. Only Pearson product moment correlations 
significant at the p ≤ .05 level are shown. 
 
  25Table 6. Importance of policy-sector, scope and Europeanization (Pearson product moment 
correlations) 
  Netherlands  Belgium  Germany  France 
Scope = scale from 0 to 19 reflecting n 
policy domains in which an actor is active 
-.40  -.27  -.28  -.18 
1.  competition policies  .50  .36  .40  .24 
2.  export promotion  .43  .37  .35  .30 
3.  environmental policy  .25  .19  .24  .36 
4.  consumer policy  .31  .19  .42  - 
5.  industrial policy  .28  .28  .28  - 
6.  research and development  .35  .30  .23  - 
7.  public health  .31  .17  -  .19 
8.  monetary policies and capital markets  -  .17  .26  - 
9.  agriculture/fisheries  .23  .17  -  - 
10.  traffic and transport  .34  -  .31  - 
11.  foreign and defence policy  -  -  -  .24 
12.  energy policy  -.20  -  .23  - 
13.  migration- and asylum policy  -  -  -.22  - 
14.  development cooperation  -.20  -  -.23  - 
15.  cultural and media policies  -  -  -  - 
16.  social security  -  -  -  - 
17.  employment policy  -  -  -  - 
18.  labour law policy  -  -  -  - 
19.  fiscal and tax policy  -  -  -  - 
Index: Only Pearson product moment correlations significant at the p ≤ .05 level are shown 
 
 
  26Literature 
Bartolini, S. (2005) Restructuring Europe: Centre Formation, System Building, and Political 
Structuring between the Nation State and the European Union, Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Bennett, R. R. (1999) ‘Business Routes of Influence in Brussels: Exploring the Choice of Direct 
Represenation’, Political Studies 47(2): 240-57. 
Beyers, J. (2002) ‘Gaining and seeking access. The European adaptation of domestic interest 
associations’, European Journal of Political Research 41(5): 585-612. 
Beyers, J. and B. Kerremans (2007) ‘The Press Coverage of Trade Issues. A Comparative 
Analysis of Public Agenda-Setting and Trade Politics’, Journal of European Public Policy 
14(2):in press.  
Börzel, T. A. (1999) ‘Towards Convergence in Europe? Institutional Adaptation to 
Europeanisation in Germany and Spain’, Journal of Common Market Studies 37(4): 573-96. 
Bouwen, P. (2002) ‘Corporate Lobbying in the European Union: The Logic of Access’, Journal 
of European Public Policy 9(3): 365-90. 
Broscheid, A. and D. Coen (2003) ‘Business Interest Representation and European Commission 
Fora: A Game Theoretic Investigation’, European Union Politics 4(2): 165-89. 
Bursens, P. (1997) ‘Environmental Interest Representation in Belgium and the EU:  
Professionalisation and Division of Labour within a Multi-Level Governance Setting’. 
Environmental Politics 6(4): 51-75. 
Coen, D. (1997) ‘The evolution of the large firm as a political actor in the European Union’, 
Journal of European Public Policy 4(1): 91-108. 
Coen, D. (1998) ‘The European Business Interest and the Nation State: Large-firm Lobbying in 
the European Union and Member States’, Journal of Public Policy 18(1): 75-100. 
Constantelos, J. (2004) ‘The Europeanization of Interest Group Politics in Italy: Business 
Associations in Rome and the Regions’, Journal of European Public Policy 11(6): 1020-40. 
Cram, L. (2001) ‘Governance 'to Go': Domestic Actors, Institutions and the Boundaries of the 
Possible’, Journal of Common Market Studies 39(4): 595-618. 
Eising, R. (2003) ‘Interest Groups: Opportunity Structures and Governance Capacity’, in K. 
Dyson and K. H. Goetz (eds) Germany, Europe and the Politics of Constraint, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, pp. 147-72. 
  27Eising, R. (2004) ‘Multilevel Governance and Business Interests in the European Union’, 
Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration 17(2): 211-45. 
Eising, R. and B. Kohler-Koch (2004) ‘Interessenpolitik im europäischen Mehrebenensystem’, in 
R. Eising and B. Kohler-Koch (eds) Interessenpolitik in Europa, Baden-Baden: Nomos, pp. 11-
75 
Fairbrass, J. and A. Jordan (2001) ‘Protecting biodiversity in the European Union: national 
barriers and European opportunities’, Journal of European Public Policy 8(4): 499-518. 
Goetz, K. (2000) ‘European Integration and National Executives: A Cause in Search of an 
Effect?’ West European Politics 23(4): 210-31. 
Gray, V. and D. Lowery (1996) ‘A Niche Theory of Interest Representation’, The Journal of 
Politics 58(1): 91-111. 
Green Cowles, M., J. Caporaso, et al. (eds) (2001) Transforming Europe. Europeanization and 
Domestic Change, London: Cornell University Press. 
Grote, J. R. and A. Lang (2003) ‘Europeanization and Organizational Change in National Trade 
Associations: An Organizational Ecology Perspective’, in K. Featherstone and C. M. Radaelli 
(eds) The Politics of Europeanization. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 225-54. 
Hacking, I. (1999) The social construction of what? Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Hanf, K. and B. Soetendorp (eds) (1998) Adapting to European Integration. Small States and the 
European Union. London: Longman. 
Harmsen, R. (1999) ‘The Europeanization of National Administrations: A Comparative Study of 
France and the Netherlands’ Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration 
12(1): 81-113. 
Hirschman, A. O. (1970) Exit, Voice and Loyalty. Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations 
and States, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Hooghe, L. and G. Marks (2001) Multi-Level Governance and European Integration, Lanham: 
Roman & Littlefield.  
Kassim, H., B. G. Peters, et al., (eds) (2000) The National Co-ordination of EU Policy. The 
Domestic Level, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Knill, C. (2001) The Europeanization of National Administrations. Patterns of Institutional 
Change and Persistence, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
  28Kohler-Koch, B. (2005) ‘European Governance and System Integration’, European Governance 
Papers c-05-01: http://www.connex-network.org/eurogov/pdf/egp-connex-C-05-01.pdf. 
Ladrech, R. (1994) ‘Europeanization of Domestic Politics and Institutions: The Case of France’, 
Journal of Common Market Studies 32(1): 69-88. 
Ladrech, R. (2005) ‘The Europeanization of Interest Groups and Political Parties’, in S. Bulmer 
and C. Lesquesne (eds) The Member States and the European Union, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, pp. 318-37. 
Marks, G. and D. McAdam (1996) ‘Social Movements and The Changing Structure of Political 
Opportunity in the European Union’, in G. Marks, F. W. Scharpf, P. W. Schmitter and W. 
Streeck (eds) Governance in the European Union,  London: Sage, pp. 95-120. 
Marks, G. and D. McAdam (1999) ‘On the Relationship of Political Opportunities to the Form of 
Collective Action: the Case of the European Union’, in D. della Porta, H. Kriesi and D. Rucht 
(eds) Social Movements in a Globalizing World, London: MacMillan, pp. 97-111. 
Michalowitz, I. (2004) ‘Lobbying as a Two-Way Strategy: Interest Intermediation or Mutual 
Instrumentalisation’, in A. Warntjen and A. Wonka (eds) Governance in Europe. The Role of 
Interest Groups, Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlaggesellschaft, pp. 76-93 
Olsen, J. P. (2003) ‘Towards a European Administrative Space’ Journal of European Public 
Policy 10(4): 506-31. 
Pfeffer, J. and G.R. Salancik (1978) The External Control of Organizations. A Resource 
Dependence Perspective, Stanford: Stanford Business Classics 
Radaelli, Claudio M. (2003) ‘The Europeanization of Public Policy’, in K. Featherstone and C. 
M. Radaelli (eds) The Politics of Europeanization. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 26-56. 
Sidenius, N. C. (1999) ‘Business, governance structures and the EU: the case of Denmark’, in B. 
Kohler-Koch and R. Eising (eds), The Transformation of Governance in the European Union, 
London: Routledge, pp. 173-88. 
Trondal, J. and F. Veggeland (2003) ‘Access, Voice and Loyalty. The Representation of 
Domestic Civil Servants in EU Committees’, Journal of European Public Policy 10(1): 59-77. 
Saurugger, S. (2005) ‘Europeanization as a Methodological Challenge: The Case of Interest 
Groups’, Journal of European Comparative Policy Analysis 7(4): 291-312.  
  29Schmidt, V.A. (1999) ‘National Patterns of Governance Under Siege’, in B. Kohler-Koch and R. 
Eising (eds), The Transformation of Governance in the European Union, London: Routledge, pp. 
155-172 
Schmitter, P.C. and W. Streeck (1999) [1982] ‘The Organization of Business Interest. Studying 
Associative Action of Business in Advanced Industrial Societies’ Discussion paper 99/1. Max 
Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, Cologne, Germany.  
Wessels, B. (2004) ‘Contestation Potential of Interest Groups in the EU: Emergence, Structure, 
and Political Alliances’, in G. Marks and M. Steenbergen (eds), European Integration and 
Political Conflict, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 195-215. 
 
  30Endnotes 
                                                 
i Another general perspective on this matter is Hirschman’s exit, voice and loyalty framework which has been 
applied by several EU-scholars (Hirschman 1970; Coen 1997 and 1998; Bennett 1999; Trondal and Veggeland 
2003; Bartolini 2004; Kohler-Koch 2005). The idea is – in a nutshell – that the process of European integration 
provides opportunities for domestic interests so that they are able to exit the iron cage of domestic politics and voice 
their concerns at the European level. As European integration tends to weaken the usefulness of exclusive national 
strategies, many interests are stimulated to direct their attention to Europe. However, organizations that are highly 
dependent on the benefits they get from their immediate environment and/or that are highly connected to domestic 
constituencies, show a low propensity to exit the domestic level. Being Europeanized is therefore typical for groups 
that offer less direct benefits to their members or that depend less on exchange relations with their constituencies. 
Also, organizations that depend only weakly for their survival on domestic institutions (for instance, because they 
receive only a small amount of subsidies from domestic agencies), will more easily transcend national borders. 
Thus, it is not necessarily the absence or the modesty of key resources that explains the low or high level of 
Europeanization. The key is that interest groups, whether they are resourceful or not, should be less dependent on 
resources or benefits they gain from their immediate environment. To put it differently, rather than the amount of 
available resources available, it is, in Hirschman’s framework, the presence or the absence of exit-options at the 
national level that affects the extent to which organizations are Europeanized (see also Marks and McAdam 1999).  
ii Our research project also includes public officials and how they interact with interest groups, but because public 
officials are not directly relevant for the problem we deal with in this paper, we do not pay extensive attention the 
interviews conducted with them.  
iii Because the larger project deals with trade policymaking, we especially focus on sources which list interest groups 
that are potentially active in this sector. The WTO-website (www.wto.org) contains a number of useful sources 
ranging from listings of interest groups and civil society organizations attending ministerial conferences, expert 
meetings, position papers delivered to the WTO and so on. Second, DG Trade of the European Commission has 
established a Civil Society Dialogue, an open process of consultation to which interest groups may subscribe 
(http://trade-info.cec.eu.int/civil_soc/intro1.php). Also from this source we retained Euro-level, Belgian, French, 
German and Dutch actors. Third, we coded all interest groups mentioned in a policy event data set that was 
developed for the purpose of this project. Fourthly, we added Euro-level, Belgian, French, German and Dutch actors 
that are listed in the WTO-history project, University of Washington (http://depts.washington.edu/wtohist). All these 
selected groups were coded on the basis of a number of variables such as type of interests (employers, trade unions, 
NGOs), policy sector in which a group is active and so on.  
iv In addition also 146 representatives of government institutions, parliamentarians and political parties were 
interviewed, but these interviews are not analyzed in this paper. The same project also includes 139 EU-level 
interest groups and public officials. There is another aspect of the table that needs to be clarified, namely the fact 
that the sample size differs considerably from country to country. Especially the bigger sample of Belgium and 
France compared to the smaller sample for Germany is noteworthy. Our sampling was aimed at a structurally 
equivalent and comparable sample across countries; this does not necessarily mean samples of an equal size. As 
such, specific institutional and political conditions within the four countries explain the different sample sizes. Two 
factors explain the size of the Belgian sample. First, there is the specific nature of the Belgian federation which 
results in a fairly fragmented interest group system. For instance, whereas in most other countries we find one 
environmental peak association, Belgium has four environmental peak associations, one for each of the sub-states 
(Bursens 1997). In addition to this, interest representation by labor unions is quite fragmented with different sectoral 
and cross-sectoral unions linked to the socialist, liberal and catholic pillars. The fragmentation of the trade union 
system is even more pronounced for France and explains the larger sample compared to Germany and, to some 
extent, the Netherlands. In Germany the existence of one big cross-sectoral trade union and its cross-sectoral 
satellites led to an identification of 15 trade unions of which 13 were sampled. A similar procedure in France led to 
the identification of 65 trade unions of which only 36 could be sampled.  
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